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Aesthetics and its Future
Problems and Perspectives
Morten Kyndrup 
abstract  This presentation argues that the question about “future” presup­
poses an analysis of the current state of the discipline, which again in turn 
must be seen in the light of its history. The presentation then unfolds a rough 
reconstruction of that history from Baumgarten and Kant, over Romanticism’s 
establishing of the partnership with Art and Truth in the continental tradition 
and up to 20th century’s settling with especially that tradition, led by endeav­
ours both within art itself, in the art sciences, and in different branches of 
philosophical aesthetics. On the basis of this, it finally discusses the future of 
aesthetics: its status as a scholarly discipline, the need for it in our world, and 
proposes some issues to be at aesthetics’ future agenda of research.
keywords  Aesthetics (as scholarly discipline), history of aesthetics, future 
of aesthetics
I
The reason for dealing with the future of an academic discipline has 
nothing to do with a wish or need to tell fortunes. In the case of eco-
nomics, the future is, of course, of very specific interest. As a discipline, 
economics is basically concerned with developing means of predicting 
economic developments. As we know, this task has not been carried out 
very successfully lately. Conversely, we have no need to really know what 
is going to happen in the field of aesthetics, at least not as scholars. Our 
reason for discussing the future would basically be the fact that this 
question immediately draws attention to the present state of things – to 
boundaries, functions, agencies and dynamics within the current physi-
ognomy of the discipline. Only through an analysis of this state can the 
question of needs and future trends be dealt with properly. 
It is certainly no secret that the field of aesthetics might be more ad-
equately characterized in the plural, as several different fields. Some of 
these fields conceive themselves as arising from and embedded in their 
very own traditions, rather often not even interested in or capable of 
entering into a dialogue with other traditions, although these refer to 
the same concept at least at headline level. To really understand what 
is going on within the discipline or disciplines of aesthetics, one must 
look back and investigate how these different traditions and understand-
ings were founded, how they were developed, and how they have been 
interacting over the course of history. In other words, the question of the 
future engenders the question of the past. Of course, the history of aes-
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thetics cannot be understood or told in a few words in a presentation like 
this. Still, it can be roughly outlined and told in what has been termed a 
“reconstructive re-description” (in another context by Richard Shuster-
man1). So this is what I will try to unfold in what follows, my point of de-
parture and purpose still being the question of the future of aesthetics. 
II
As we know, the term aesthetics was invented by Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgarten during the 1730s and developed in his Aesthetica (1750–
1758).2 In the years to come, the term and the discipline spread in Europe 
at an astonishing rate considering the technologies for information ex-
change at that time. For instance, a chair of aesthetics was established 
at the University of Copenhagen as early as in 1788. This, however, does 
not imply that the discipline as such was unambiguously defined and 
delimited already at that time. On the contrary, Baumgarten’s definitions 
and reflections themselves were rather loose. Not even his own immedi-
ate successors, such as G. F. Meier (1718–1777), were especially true to his 
ideas. The most prominent and influential further development of the 
concept of aesthetics in Baumgarten’s own age was signed by Immanuel 
Kant.3 Despite the huge differences between Baumgarten and Kant, in 
particular regarding Kant’s emphasis on the judgment of taste and on 
reflexive relationality, Baumgarten and Kant actually do agree about cer-
tain decisive, fundamental properties of the concept. They both conceive 
of aesthetics as a broad concept, especially in terms of comprising more 
than just the reflection upon art. Furthermore, they both basically see the 
aesthetic as something connected to a specific kind of relation between 
subject and object concerning a certain kind of experience or perceptive 
mode. 
The invention – or the discovery, as some would put it – of the aes-
thetic is essentially an integral part of the ongoing 18th century forma-
tion of the Modern in its widest sense. This process is above all a process 
of establishing distinctions, of dividing society (and social signification 
as a whole) into different areas with distinctive rules for the internal and 
external exchange of meaning. The autonomous field or system of art – 
the term now being used as a collective singular comprising the singular 
art forms – is conceptually completed at roughly the same time as the 
invention of the concept of aesthetics (as we have learned from, among 
others, Paul Oskar Kristeller4). This conjunction is neither coincidental 
nor void of consequences for the interrelationship between art and the 
aesthetic in the process that followed. 
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III
In early romanticism, the interrelationship between art and the aesthetic 
underwent a radical transformation which came to influence the further 
development of aesthetics as a discipline dramatically and decisively in 
the centuries to come. The new constellation may be described meta-
phorically as a “marriage” between art and the aesthetic, as I have shown 
elsewhere.5 Whereas in Baumgarten an experience of art and artworks 
clearly forms part – but not the only part – of what is conceived of as 
aesthetic perception and appreciation, early romanticism establishes a 
kind of symmetrical alliance between art and the aesthetic, among other 
things including the fact of shared borderlines. Symptomatic in this re-
spect is the famous Älteste Systemprogramm des Deutschen Idealismus 
(“The Oldest System Program of German Idealism”), a fragment writ-
ten by Hegel, Hölderlin or Schelling in 1796–97.6 In this fragment it is 
stated that beauty shall become the idea to unite all ideas; the aesthetic 
act becomes the highest achievable act of human reason and the one to 
unify the true and the good. The emphasis on truth here is decisive, and 
truth does indeed become the cornerstone of this new relationship, of 
this marriage, between art and the aesthetic. According to the fragment, 
poetry should be considered the teacher of mankind. Only poetry shall 
survive all sciences and arts. 
A couple of decennia later, in Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, aes-
thetics is defined as philosophy of art, tout court. But this is to be under-
stood in a very specific sense. In the monstrous historical and systematic 
architecture of Hegel’s aesthetic thinking, once again poetry is the art form 
representing the highest achievable historical level of development. And 
why? Because, as it is stated, only in poetry has the spirit been set free, 
is it no longer restricted by “das äusserlich-sinnliche”, by the sensuous el-
ement, by the surface.7 The highest level of art is the level at which art 
transgresses its own status as sensuous and becomes sheer truth – in other 
words, when art finally becomes philosophy – according to Hegel. Aesthet-
ics thus becomes philosophy of art in the sense that its aim is to extract 
and expose the truth content of art and artworks, their Wahrheitsgehalt, as 
it is phrased later on, for instance by Adorno.8 This, indeed, is a somewhat 
paradoxical approach, since the task of aesthetics is thus transformed into 
going behind or beyond what seems to be the most immediate and impor-
tant property of its object: its sensuous quality. Still, this paradox, resting 
on a delicate balance of symmetry and asymmetry between art and aes-
thetics, lays the ground for a very strong alliance, a “marriage”, in which the 
transactional axes are capable of keeping the relationship alive. The price 
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for keeping this alliance going has, however, been high. In certain respects 
this “speculative tradition”, as it has been called by Jean-Marie Schaeffer in 
his severe critique of it, may have been extremely damaging to art itself 
by making it – in Schaeffer’s view – “ecstatically cognitive”.9 And in this 
continental tradition, aesthetics – still according to Schaeffer – has ended 
up depriving itself of any credibility as a scholarly discipline by insistently 
conflating descriptive and evaluative approaches. 
Damaging or not, aesthetics in this continental sense became an inte-
gral part of the art system’s self-understanding and thus its self-defense 
– in other words, part of its ability to recreate itself, of its autopoiesis, 
as it has been termed by Niklas Luhmann.10 In this sense, the alliance 
implied immediate mutual advantages to both art and aesthetics – to the 
latter, for instance, that of being included in the distinct aura of autono-
mous art and consequently set free from basic purposive rationality – 
Zweck rationalität – as well as from scientific objectivity. Conversely, this 
al liance has certainly entailed problems. While the accusation that it liter-
ally ruined art may be somewhat exaggerated, aesthetics in this continen-
tal tradition has most certainly engendered a series of problematic and 
obscure interrelationships and borderline quarrels within aesthetics. One 
is that this aesthetic tradition has produced a chronically problematic in-
terrelationship with the endeavors of the “art sciences” – that is to say, 
comparative literature, art history, musicology and so forth. Furthermore, 
aesthetics has developed an increasingly problematic relationship to art 
itself, especially from the 20th century avant-garde and modernist move-
ments and onward. Even its position in philos ophy has become increas-
ingly unclear, primarily due to its insistently evaluative approach.
IV
Of course, many alternative traditions of understanding aesthetics and 
the aesthetic developed over the two centuries since romanticism. These 
included several attempts to revive the Kantian understanding of aes-
thetics and efforts to extend the understanding of aesthetic perception to 
the field of psychology (e.g., Gustav Theodor Fechner’s work11). None of 
these, however, could really match the influence of what is known as the 
continental tradition in aesthetics. In the light of this influence, it is in-
teresting to note that over the centuries this tradition became still more 
inadequate and awkward in its relationships both to its fields of objects 
and to its neighboring disciplines. To be sure, certain developments in 
practice and in theory may even be interpreted as rebellions against the 
continental tradition’s dominant understanding of art. 
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Above all, this interpretation (as a rebellion) seems plausible concern-
ing the historical changes in art itself, especially in the 20th century. 
Whereas the aesthetic understanding of art emphasized the truth con-
tent of artworks, art itself seemed to be attempting to escape or resist 
such an understanding ever more frenetically by producing works that 
simply could not be perceived adequately within the framework of this 
paradigm of truth content. This is, of course, in particular true of the 
historical avant-garde’s (and in a broader sense modernism’s) radical 
questioning of almost any thinkable traditional category of art under-
standing: the very concept of the artwork as an entity, the form/content 
distinction, the status of “style”, craftsmanship as the exponent of mas-
tery/genius and so forth. What kind of privileged truth would the Gehalt 
of a readymade be? In what sense would a Dadaist performance contrib-
ute to a distinctively deeper insight into the spirit of mankind? Or, later 
on, how could the sheer doubling of everyday phenomena in what was 
called Sozialplastik in itself represent some elevated truth about every-
day life? Of course, certain occurrences of the avant-garde (e.g., surreal-
ism) might in some sense fit into the cognitive paradigm of continental 
aesthetics, and surely 20th century art as a whole may be interpreted 
as deeply reflexabhängig, that is to say, dependent by negation on this 
paradigm. Art is becoming increasingly busy investigating above all art’s 
own nature, and thus turning art, as it is put in Schaeffer, into something 
“ecstatically cognitive”, deprived of any sensuous quality. 
However, notwithstanding an understanding of the historical changes 
in art as an open rebellion or just as an alternative line of development, 
the representatives of this paradigm of aesthetic understanding fell short 
of possessing explanatory force and of offering an adequate understand-
ing of what was at stake in contemporary art. A prominent example is 
Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno’s rejection of, for instance, jazz music tout 
court and of Igor Stravinsky’s work as kitschy non-art.12 Concurrently, 
alternative understandings were developing in the “art sciences depart-
ments”, most often detached from the departments of aesthetics, which 
in turn belong to Philosophy. This of course is another long story, but to 
make it short, the wish and need for an adequate understanding of mod-
ern art gave rise to a theoretical development which was above all based 
on various understandings of artistic significations as acts rather then 
as stable containers of truthful meaning. Rooted in phenom enology, in 
early formalism and in structuralism, pragmatism and semiotics, the 
second half of the 20th century would eventually offer theoretical and 
analytical tools and devices from, for instance, theory of reception, enun-
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ciation analysis, advanced narratology, performative aesthetics and so 
on. One would even encounter the term Rezeptionsästhetik, a somewhat 
pleonastic designation compared to the original endeavours of early aes-
thetics. But this time it came from “below” and was rooted in the art 
sciences, in this case Literaturwissenschaft. However, the more these new 
ways of approaching and understanding artworks became adequate in 
terms of their power of explanation as regards art, the less they could be 
fitted into the understanding of art in continental aesthetics as above all 
a distinctively privileged emanation of truth. 
This state of non-adequacy became obvious and increasingly intoler-
able also to philosophical aesthetics itself. Over the 20th century quite a 
few new traditions in aesthetics appeared, mutually different but united 
in their critique of the basic paradigms of the continental tradition. The 
analytical tradition, especially strong in the Anglo-American area, is of 
course one prominent example. But also on the continent broader con-
cepts of the aesthetic were developed. The 1992 conference Die Aktualität 
des Ästhetischen in Hannover became a real confrontation between the 
existing tradition and efforts to renew and broaden the concepts. Karl-
Heinz Bohrer’s famous words in the inauguration address may stand as 
a monument of that discussion: “Ein Terror liegt über dem Land: Die 
Akzeptanz des Ästhetischen,” he said.13 Efforts to establish a somewhat 
secularized aesthetics, an aesthetics capable of understanding, for in-
stance, contemporary society’s obvious thorough aestheticization, were 
here interpreted as Terror. Indeed, this is quite an astonishing term, but 
symptomatic of the intensity of the discussion, which has reigned ever 
since, especially in Germany. Today we meet different outlines of broader 
concepts in, for instance, the work of Martin Seel, Gernot Böhme or the 
now US-based Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht.14 The French-speaking area has 
seen similar changes in the conceptualization of the aesthetic. Jean-Marie 
Schaeffer’s harsh critique of what he calls the “speculative tradition” has 
already been mentioned. But one might also point out endeavors as dif-
ferent as Thierry de Duve’s re-injection of Kant “after” (in a double sense) 
Duchamp, Jacques Rancière’s re-interpretation of the political versus the 
aesthetic (très à la mode right now), or Gérard Genette’s interesting cool-
minded analysis of the aesthetic as purely relational.15 
Returning to the question of the future of aesthetics: are we not on 
the whole in a privileged situation, given the many current fruitful en-
deavors, given the thorough critique of obviously obsolete alliances, and 
given the productive attempts to bridge old gaps between approaches 
of the art sciences and of philosophical aesthetics, respectively, and the 
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unfolding and self-understanding of art? The answer to this is both yes 
and no. It is “yes” in the sense that this settlement is highly necessary and 
certainly contains inspiring, path-breaking and promising approaches. 
But unfortunately the answer is “no” in a couple of other respects: one 
is related to the fact that although several new approaches are at hand, 
in many ways they are still astonishingly different; the other is based on 
the fact that the older traditions are seemingly still alive and even very 
strong in some places, especially the continental tradition including its 
conflations and confusions of evaluation and description. And although 
divergences, quarrels and debates may be pertinent, often useful and 
even indispensable to a scholarly field, this is not necessarily true of 
every disagreement. In the case of aesthetics today, the quarrels seem to 
include very fundamental issues, such as the discursive status of the dis-
cipline, its primary tasks, and its position in the disciplinary landscape. 
These are issues actually pertaining to which playing field you want to 
choose. Decent conflicts provide shared playing fields. Different playing 
fields very easily make any discussion downright counterproductive – 
and may lead to nothing but the construction of closed camps – that is, to 
exclusively private battlegrounds. Private battlegrounds may be nice to 
have for the owner and his crew, but they are of little interest to anyone 
else. 
V
So, the really interesting question would obviously be: is it possible to 
find and define a joint battleground or playing field like this? Or, if we 
leave behind the metaphors of fighting and game-playing: is it possible 
to agree about certain fundamental delimitations, within the framework 
of which at least the most important traditions and initiatives in aesthet-
ics today could consent to work, not “together” in terms of everybody 
agreeing about everything, but as part of a joint endeavour where we 
agree on how and when to disagree within aesthetics as one discipline? 
No one can actually know whether this is possible or not. But one might 
point out certain core issues to start out with in order to achieve this goal. 
Once again based on the historical reconstruction, I would propose three 
key problems or areas to be worked out as a precondition for establish-
ing a common playing field. Areas to be cleared up, if you wish. 
First, the relationship between art and the aesthetic should be thor-
oughly redefined. The old-fashioned (and conceptually obsolete) mar-
riage between the two should be terminated and replaced by a modern 
concubinat based on distinctions and mutual respect rather than on re-
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semblances and ownership. In other words, it is important to acknowl-
edge that the territories of art and the aesthetic, respectively, have dif-
ferent conceptual modes and therefore do not share borderlines. The 
distinction should thus be based on the fact that any artwork may be aes-
thetic in the sense that it may be part of an aesthetic relation. But on the 
other hand, an artwork’s “aestheticity” is not exhaustive of its prop erties 
as a whole: an artwork (like any other artefact) has other qualitative di-
mensions, which may be studied as such in their own right. Similarly, 
aesthetic relations and aesthetic value are not to be found only in connec-
tion with artworks. So design, nature, in principle everything which may 
be perceived as addressing us by establishing a relation of this distinctive 
aesthetic kind, may be or become “aesthetic”. As Wolfgang Iser has put 
it recently, the aesthetic may be understood as a “modelling operation”.16 
Or, as Gérard Genette writes in La relation esthétique, the aesthetic is “not 
dispositional, but resultative.”17 To spell it out: the field of the aesthetic 
is neither smaller nor greater than that of art, which in turn is neither 
smaller nor greater than that of the aesthetic. They are just different, one 
pertaining to a certain mode of perception and the other to a certain dis-
cursive area. This of course should be worked out thoroughly. 
The second, closely connected issue is the question of where to find the 
aesthetic. Is aesthetic value absolutely relational and exclusively singu-
lar? Or is it object-bound: inherent to certain objects which are thus in 
possession of “aesthetic quality”? The answer is neither the one nor the 
other, but both, although in different modes. Real – or realized – aesthetic 
value is relational and does include a judgment of taste in a Kantian 
sense. But artefacts, including artworks, may be construed as possessing 
potential aesthetic value as a function of their embedded, “enounced” 
enunciation.18 This potential or embedded aesthetic value may be ana-
lyzed and discussed, just as implied effects of reception can be. So the an-
swer could be that the aesthetic is here and there, but in different modes 
of existence – this of course needs to be investigated further as well. 
The third issue, then, would be that of the status and task of the dis-
cipline itself, especially concerning the question of value. Not many 
would disagree that the aesthetic is about the ascription/engendering/
perception of a certain kind of value. But what should the discipline itself 
do? Should aesthetics represent aesthetic value, serving as the Supreme 
Court judging the amount and quality of aesthetic values in relations, 
artefacts or whatever? Would a scholar in aesthetics be the person es-
pecially trained to pronounce privileged aesthetic judgments, and the dis-
cipline thus one that acts, so to speak, as the correlate of ordinary people’s 
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every day aesthetic judgments? Or, conversely, should aesthetics rather be 
the discipline studying the pronunciation of aesthetic judgments, their 
mechanisms, history, importance – in short, the engendering and effects 
of aesthetic value, parallel to the study of any other existing phenomenon 
in the world we live in? Or to put it in another way: is the task of aesthet-
ics cognitive in the sense that it investigates a phenomenon in order to 
achieve knowledge about it, exactly like any other human “science” (as we 
call it on the continent), knowledge that can also be shared and explored 
in other contexts? Or is the task of aesthetics basically evaluative, the 
purpose of which is to distinguish between levels of aesthetic quality? 
This question is unavoidable because it touches upon the very criteria of 
pertinence for the discipline’s achievements. Of course, scholars of aes-
thetics may and will pronounce aesthetic judgments – everybody does so 
all the time. And when we are acting as, for instance, art critics, the pro-
nunciation of judgments is the very purpose of our professional activity. 
But as soon as we start claiming that we, qua scholars of aesthetics, rep-
resent and are capable of pronouncing distinctively privileged aesthetic 
judgments, we can no longer be viewed as studying these judgments in 
value-free and objective scholarly approaches. We will have to choose be-
tween these approaches. As may be evident from this discussion, in my 
opinion the blaming – as in Schaeffer – of major traditions in aesthetics 
(especially the continental one) for having conflated the evaluative and 
the descriptive is highly justified.
 
VI
Returning to the question of the future once again: let us imagine for 
a moment that the relationship between art and the aesthetic had been 
successfully cleared up, thus establishing a broad consensus concerning 
the field of object, the delimitations and the discursive mode of the disci-
pline, or at least a pronounced consensus on a roadmap for solving these 
problems. Then one might ask again: would aesthetics as a discipline 
have a future? Should it? And if so, why? 
The answers to these questions would be based on an examination 
of at least two major issues. The first is the question of whether aes-
thetics as a discipline is actually capable of constituting a genuine field 
of knowledge. The second is the question of whether our world in fact 
needs this kind of knowledge. Would it be useful to anybody? It shall 
be noted that these two issues should be examined independently, and 
that the confirmation of just one of them might be sufficient in order to 
support a future for aesthetics. In academic history we have examples 
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both of areas which do not constitute genuine disciplinary fields as such 
– “cultural studies”, for instance – and yet which are cognitively useful, 
and, conversely, genuine disciplinary fields whose achievements have 
not at any given time appeared immediately useful; mathematics might 
serve as an example here. 
However, aesthetics, it seems, would hardly have any problems in 
either of these respects. Of course, there is still a long way to go concern-
ing the status and delimitations of its fields of interest. As mentioned 
above, the separation from art – and from philosophy of art – seems to 
be a precondition for establishing real research in art’s distinctively aes-
thetic potentials and effects. But based on an approach to the aesthetic 
as a distinct kind of perceptual mode including the engendering of a cer-
tain kind of reflexive judgment and thus ascription of value, it should be 
clear that a discipline studying aesthetic relations in this manner – their 
specificity, history, extension, mode of function – might easily constitute 
a genuine disciplinary field. This of course presumes that aesthetic rela-
tions actually can be distinguished from other kinds of relations. But not 
many would doubt they can be distinguished, even with increasing ease, 
inasmuch as they form part of modern society’s seemingly ever growing 
differentiation processes. So yes, the establishment of a genuine, delimi-
tated field of object is definitely within reach – providing, of course, that 
a joint, institutional effort to achieve such a disciplinary process of con-
vergence is being made. 
The question of usefulness is not too difficult to answer either. The 
world we live in, our surroundings as a whole are increasingly character-
ized by having been consciously formed to address us, to make us enter 
into value-based relations. This applies to all kinds of products, from 
clothes and food to our physical surroundings in the form of architec-
ture, urban space, even the landscape. We live in a world of design, in a 
designed world, in a world addressing us each and every moment. The 
establishment of aesthetic relations is part of this ongoing invitation to 
take a stance, to judge and to choose. It is a sociological fact that the 
extension and importance of judgments of taste are growing, both as 
concerns their role in our individual lives (and the more prevailing the 
younger the generation) and their importance quantitatively as well as 
qualitatively in society as a whole. This process of aestheticization, as it is 
being called, includes of course the mode of function of the mass media 
– and evidently that of the art world. 
It is not difficult to see that if we are to live in an “experience society” 
like this, we need to understand its mechanisms and ongoing processes. 
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We need to analyze the physiognomy and extension of the process of 
aesthetisization and we need to be able to distinguish between various 
types of aesthetic and quasi-aesthetic relations. We also need to be able 
to subdivide these relationalities and to delimit them toward other kinds 
of relations simply in order to understand the world we live in, its mecha-
nisms, and its impact on socialization, on individual identity, on creativ-
ity, and on the quality of our lives in a general sense. These needs are 
definitely reason enough for the “usefulness” of aesthetics as a discipline. 
And yet there is even more to it: this development in our society has 
turned the creation and spread of aesthetically addressed artefacts in the 
widest sense into a very important field economically as well, with the 
result that the use and distribution of resources within this field is be-
coming increasingly important, also economically, to society as a whole. 
Equally important is of course the development of adequate methods for 
aesthetic production in the widest sense, including methods for analyz-
ing the effectiveness and quality of engendered aesthetic relations. All 
this undeniably calls for scholarly insight into the nature and life of aes-
thetic relations, and for skills in aesthetic analysis in general. 
VII
The need for and the usefulness of insight into aesthetics in the general 
sense described above is thus hardly disputable. On the other hand, there 
would probably be differing opinions about what to highlight on the 
research agenda. So, to make this discussion of the future of aesthetics 
more concrete, I shall end this short presentation by proposing two areas 
which, in my view, would be distinctively productive topics in the cur-
rent situation of the discipline. 
The first topic concerns what is called autonomy of art – in particular 
as compared to the “autonomy” or specificity of the aesthetic. As I have 
argued, it is important to distinguish between the establishment of art 
as an autonomous area or system in Modernity on the one hand and the 
conceptualization of a certain mode of perception – the aesthetic – on 
the other. But just as the aesthetic has been misunderstood in various 
ways (especially by interpreting it as purely object-bound), serious short-
circuits are around in the understanding of the historical changes in and 
the anatomy and function of art’s autonomy. “Autonomy” is often un-
derstood in terms of an exclusively thematic category, as an imperative 
that art must in fact not deal with real-world problems such as political 
and social matters. So every time art goes social or political or interferes 
directly in everyday life, it is proclaimed that this is a transgression of 
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art’s autonomy, that art is being brought “back to life” – in other words, 
the supposed project of the historical avant-gardes pops up again. This, 
however, is a serious, reductive misunderstanding of the mode of func-
tion of art’s autonomy. Art’s autonomy today is by no means restrictive 
or delimitating concerning what art could do, where it could do it, and 
its intentions. Art has no borders “outside” itself; art’s borderlines are far 
more advanced: they are internal and pertain to art’s mode of function as 
a producer of meaning. Art’s autonomy implies that whatever art – art-
works, artists in the name of art and so on – does is being done as art and 
is understood as art. “Political art” is thus not politics, but art going politi-
cal. This fact of course represents the enormous freedom of art – and its 
prison as well. Anyway: the recurring idea that art’s autonomy is coming 
to an end based on art’s intervention into other life spheres cannot be 
sustained. From a semiotic perspective, “art” is stronger than ever. It is 
literally capable of turning shit to gold, absence to meaning, resemblance 
to difference – as we have seen over the course of the 20th century. If an 
adequate understanding of the distinctive anatomy of art’s delimitation 
problematic is so important to aesthetics, it is because the aesthetic di-
mension of art is on the one hand of crucial importance in dealing with 
artworks – and on the other should still be distinguished from art’s “art-
ness”, which includes much more than its aesthetic capacities. 
The other topic of specific and current interest concerns the devel-
opment of tools and methods for analyzing the embedded aesthetic 
“directedness” of artefacts in general. This is a matter which concerns 
distinctive levels of the artefacts, but which – once again with a primary 
reference to artworks – does not exhaust their qualitative properties as 
a whole. In his book on Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze proposes divid-
ing the total amount of relations of any given enoncé into three tranches 
d’éspace (“slices of space”) – the three of them being in function simulta-
neously and yet mutually independent.19 They are referred to as comple-
mentary (concerning “home” or other discursive fields), collateral (con-
cerning semantic or semiotic connections to other artefacts of the same 
genus) and correlative, respectively. The correlative slice concerns the 
artefact’s relationalities, its specific ways of establishing relations to its 
own sender and receiver. Aesthetic quality and potentials clearly pertain 
to the correlative level. Although real aesthetic value is singular and is 
produced in individual aesthetic relations, artefacts – from artworks to 
design – are engendered in order to produce certain aesthetic effects. 
The ability to analyze these is of core importance to aesthetics (both in 
the macro-perspective of society and in micro-perspectives such as the 
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delivering of useful tools to the sphere of aesthetic production). In this 
respect, aesthetic analysis also seems to be an obvious locus for fruit-
ful cooperation between aesthetics and, for instance, “art sciences”, art 
theory, linguistics/semiotics and sociology. 
So much for a couple of topics we need to know and think more about. 
I cannot help concluding this essay by once again emphasizing one ap-
proach we do not need in aesthetics: the one seeing the discipline of aes-
thetics as an instance of defining and maintaining norms for aesthetic 
value. We definitely need to distinguish sharply between the study of 
aesthetic relations, judgments and values and the pronunciation of aes-
thetic judgments by active partakers in these relations. The task of aes-
thetics is not to represent aesthetic values, but to study the engendering 
of aesthetic values (and their anatomy, importance, history and so on). 
Aesthetics must insist on drawing a clear distinction between its fields 
of study and its own activity if it is to be taken seriously as an academic 
discipline. And the future of aesthetics, I believe, is not that of a brother-
hood of shared judgments of taste. It is that of a scholarly discipline, the 
achievements of which are highly necessary for our understanding of the 
world we live in. 
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